Existence of Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Altruistic Growth Economies by Łukasz Balbus et al.
J Optim Theory Appl (2015) 165:295–315
DOI 10.1007/s10957-014-0555-1
Existence of Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria
in Stochastic Altruistic Growth Economies
Łukasz Balbus · Anna Jas´kiewicz ·
Andrzej S. Nowak
Received: 22 August 2013 / Accepted: 12 March 2014 / Published online: 2 April 2014
© The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract We study an altruistic growth model with production uncertainty viewed
as an intergenerational stochastic game. The existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria is proved under general assumptions on utility functions for the generations
and for non-atomic transition probabilities. This paper answers some issues that arose
from the literature in the 1980s decade.
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1 Introduction
In many real-life situations, the preferences of an economic agent change over time.
Rational behaviour of such agents was studied by Strotz [1], Pollak [2], Bernheim and
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Ray [3] who considered so-called ‘consistent plans’. Phelps and Pollak [4] introduced
the notion of ‘quasi-hyperbolic discounting’, which is a modification of the classi-
cal discounting proposed in 1937 by Samuelson [5]. Within such a framework, an
economic agent is represented by a sequence of ‘selves’ who play a non-cooperative
discrete-time dynamic game with appropriately defined payoff functions, see [6] and
references cited therein. Alternatively, one can look at the model of Phelps and Pol-
lak [4] as an intergenerational game with altruism between generations. In such a
game, it is assumed that each generation lives over just one period and consumes a
fixed good. The part left after consumption constitutes an investment for following
generations. Therefore, each generation derives utility from its own consumption and
those of its descendants. The next generation’s endowment is determined by invest-
ment and certain production function.
The existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium in an intergenerational dynamic
game is a fixed point problem in an appropriately defined function space. The set
of possible endowments is usually an interval in the real line. This problem was
successfully treated by Bernheim and Ray [7,8] and Leininger [9] for certain classes
of deterministic bequest games, where utility of each generation depends only on its
own consumption and that of an immediate descendant (see also pp. 507–509 in [10]).
Related results on subgame Markov perfect equilibria were also obtained in [11,12]. In
particular, Ray [12] dealt with games with general utility functions depending on partial
utilities of countably many descendants. These models are termed ‘nonpaternalistic
intergenerational altruism models’. Unfortunately, Lemma 6 in [12] is false. Certain
difficulties arising in the study of deterministic intergenerational games are discussed
in Sect. 5. The erroneously stated results from [12] were later applied by Bernheim
and Ray [13] to a general intergenerational game, known also as an ‘altruistic growth
model’ with production uncertainty.
In this paper, we examine a general version of Bernheim and Ray’s model [13]
using a completely different proof’s technique based on a certain extension of Fatou’s
Lemma for varying probability measures [14]. Similarly as in [6,13], we assume that
the transition probabilities are non-atomic. As shown in Sect. 5, this assumption plays
an important role in our approach. A common representation of the transition proba-
bility (stochastic production function) in various models in economic growth theory
is given by a difference equation involving a sequence of i.i.d. random shocks; see for
instance [3,6,13,15,16] and references cited therein. For example, Harris and Laib-
son [6] considered a model with a linear production function with additive shocks
and proved the existence theorem on Markov perfect equilibria for so-called ‘hyper-
bolic consumers’. Other results on intergenerational stochastic games are obtained
under different and more specific assumptions on the transition probability functions.
A detailed discussion of the literature is given in Remarks 3.2 and 3.3.
2 The Model
Let R be the set of all real numbers, N denotes the set of all positive integers. Put
S := [0, s] for some fixed s > 0. Let S∞ := S × S × . . . be endowed with the product
topology and the Borel σ -algebra. Define
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A(s) := [0, s] for every s ∈ S and D := {(s, a) : s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)}.
Consider an infinite sequence of generations labelled by t ∈ N. There is one com-
modity, which may be consumed or invested. Every generation lives one period and
derives utility from its own consumption and consumptions of some or all of its descen-
dants. Generation t receives the endowment st ∈ S and chooses consumption at a level
at ∈ A(st ). The investment of yt := st −at determines the endowment of its successor
according to the transition probability q from S to S, which depends on yt ∈ A(st ).
Furthermore, for any t ∈ N by Ht , we denote the set of all sequences
ht = (at , st+1, at+1, st+2, . . . ) ∈ S∞ such that (sk, ak) ∈ D for all k ≥ t.
Ht is the set of feasible future histories of the consumption-investment process from
period t onwards. Following Bernheim and Ray [13], we assume that generation t’s
preferences are represented by the utility function of the form
Ut (ht ) := u(at ) + w(at+1, at+2, . . . ) (1)
where u : S → R and w : S∞ → R are bounded Borel measurable functions.
Let  be the set of Borel measurable functions ϕ : S → S such that ϕ(s) ∈ A(s)
for each s ∈ S. A strategy for generation t is a function ct ∈ . If ct = c for all t ∈ N
and some c ∈ , then we say that the generations employ a stationary strategy. The
transition probability induced by q and any c ∈  is q(·|i(s)) where i(s) := s − c(s)
is the investment or saving in state s ∈ S.
We endow Ht with the product σ -algebra. Assume that every generation τ (τ ≥ t)
is going to employ a stationary strategy c ∈ . By the Ionescu-Tulcea theorem (see
Proposition V.1.1 in [17] or Chapter 7 in [18]), for each st ∈ S, there exists a unique
probability measure Pcst on H
t induced by the stationary strategy c ∈  used by each
generation τ (τ ≥ t) and the transition probability q. By Ecst , we denote the expectation
operator corresponding to the measure Pcst . Then the expected utility of generation t is
Wt (c)(st ) := Ecst Ut (ht ) = u(c(st )) + Ecst [w(at+1, at+2, . . . )].
For any c ∈ , j ≥ 2 and s j ∈ S, put
J (c)(s j ) := Ecs j [w(a j , a j+1, . . . )]. (2)
In the sequel, we assume that w is continuous. This fact will imply that w is the
uniform limit of a sequence (wn)n∈N of continuous functions, where wn depends on
first n coordinates in S∞. Clearly, every wn can also be viewed as a function on S∞.
Then, we have that







wn(c(st+1), c(st+2), . . . , c(st+n))q(dst+n |i(st+n−1)) · · · q(dst+2|i(st+1))
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and by the dominated convergence theorem












P(a, c)(s) := u(a) +
∫
S
J (c)(s′)q(ds′|s − a),
where s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s) and c ∈ . If st = s, then P(a, c)(s) is the utility for generation
t choosing a ∈ A(st ) in this state under the assumption that all future generations will
employ a stationary strategy c ∈ .
Definition 2.1 A Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SM P E) is a function c∗ ∈
 such that for every s ∈ S we have
sup
a∈A(s)
P(a, c∗)(s) = P(c∗(s), c∗)(s) = W (c∗)(s). (4)
Note that equality (4) says that, if all descendants of generation t are going to
employ c∗, then the best choice for the fresh generation in state s = st ∈ S is c∗(st ).
Arguments for studying a SMPE are based on its simplicity and the property that
behaviour of the players is independent of irrelevant payoff histories [19].
Utility functions of the form (1) were considered by Bernheim and Ray [13]. How-
ever, two special cases, strongly exploited in the literature, are worth mentioning.
Namely, in a number of papers, it is assumed that
Ut (ht ) := u(at ) + w˜(at+1), (5)
where w˜ is a function of one variable. This model is called an intergenerational game
with paternalistic altruism or a bequest game. The reader is referred to the follow-
ing papers [8–10,20–22], where this case was described in details. The second model,
intensively studied by numerous authors, is concerned with a generalisation of Samuel-
son’s discounted utility [5] and was suggested by Phelps and Pollak [4]. Then, utility
(1) takes the following form
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where α > 0 is a short-run discount factor, β ∈]0, 1[ is a long-run discount factor;
see [6]. Sometimes, α is also called as an altruism factor towards future genera-
tions. This intergenerational game can be viewed as a dynamic choice model with
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Such a formulation of the problem is due to Phelps and
Pollak [4] and was applied by Harris and Laibson [6] to a study of a consumption and
savings model under uncertainty with ‘hyperbolic consumers’. Within such a frame-
work, an individual decision maker is represented by a sequence of ‘selves’ indexed
by discrete-time parameter t ∈ R, who play a sequential game. The utility of self t is
defined as in (6) and corresponds to the situation, where preferences of the decision
maker change over time. For more detailed discussion, the reader is referred to [6] and
references cited therein.
3 The Main Result
Let Y be a compact metric space. By C(Y ), we denote the set of all real-valued continu-
ous functions on Y. Clearly, C(Y ) is a Banach space when endowed with the supremum
norm. By P(Y ), we denote the set of all probability measures on the Borel subsets
of Y. It is assumed that P(Y ) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
A sequence (μn)n∈N of probability measures on Y converges weakly to someμ ∈ P(Y )




Y g(y)μ(dy) for every
g ∈ C(Y ).
We now formulate our basic assumptions.
(A1) u ∈ C(S) is strictly concave and increasing and w ∈ C(S∞);
(A2) q is weakly continuous on S, that is, if ym → y0 in S (as m → ∞), then
q(·|ym) ⇒ q(·|y0). Moreover, for each y ∈ S \ {0}, the probability measure q(·|y) is
non-atomic, q(·|0) is non-atomic or q({0}|0) = 1.
Remark 3.1 Assumption (A1) implies that the functions u and w are bounded. If we
wish to deal with unbounded utility functions, e.g. the logarithmic function, then some
integrability conditions must be met. Moreover, certain requirements on consumption
strategies can be unavoidable, either. For instance, let us consider the model with
‘hyperbolic consumers’ [4,6], i.e. when the utility of generation t is the expected
value of (6). Assume that S = [0, 1] and u(a) = ln a. Further, suppose that each
generation uses the same strategy: c(s) = exp (−1/s) for s > 0 and c(0) = 0. Sup-
pose also that the transition probability at each state enjoys the uniform distribution





ds = −∞. Hence, it follows that the expected
utility of each generation t equals −∞. This fact implies that c constitutes an equilib-
rium that is rather senseless. In order to obtain the existence of reasonable equilibria
in games with unbounded from below utility functions u, one has to impose additional
and rather technical assumptions. Such problems do not arise in the deterministic case.
If w is bounded, then our results can also be stated for unbounded, e.g. isoelastic utility
functions u.
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Remark 3.2 A typical representation of the transition probability in economic growth
theory is
st+1 = f¯ (yt , zt ),
where yt = st − at is the investment in state st , (zt )t∈N is a sequence of i.i.d. ran-
dom ‘shocks’ having a probability distribution π ; see [3,13,15,16] for example. The




1B( f¯ (y, z))π(dz).
We would like to point out three special cases:
(C1) f¯ (yt , zt ) = zt f1(yt ) + (1 − zt ) f2(yt ) where f1, f2 : S → S are continuous
increasing functions such that f1(y) < f2(y) for each y ∈]0, s¯[ and f1(0) = f2(0) =
0. In addition, π is a non-atomic probability measure on [0, 1].
(C2) The model with additive shocks: f¯ (yt , zt ) = f (yt ) + zt where f : S → S
is a continuous increasing function. In addition, there is a state sˆ ∈]0, s¯[ such that
f (y) > y for y ∈]0, sˆ[ and f (y) < y for y ∈]sˆ, s¯[. The probability measure π is
non-atomic with support included in [0, s¯ − f (s¯)].
(C3) The model with multiplicative shocks: f¯ (yt , zt ) = f (yt )zt where f is as in
(C2) and the probability measure π is non-atomic with support included in [0, s¯/ f (s¯)].
A more specific transition probability is of the following form:
(C4) q(B|y) = ∑lj=1 g j (y)μ j (B) where B is a Borel subset of S, μ1, . . . , μl are
non-negative measures on S and the functions g1, . . . , gl ≥ 0 are continuous.
In all cases (C1)–(C3), the transition probability q satisfies assumption (A2). If the
measures μ1, . . . , μl are non-atomic, then q given in (C4) also satisfies (A2). There-
fore, our model embraces all these particular aforementioned transition probabilities.
Let I denotes the set of non-decreasing lower semicontinuous functions φ : S → R
such that φ(s) ∈ A(s) for each s ∈ S. Note that every φ ∈ I is continuous from the
left and has at most a countable number of discontinuity points. Put
F := {c ∈  : c(s) = s − i(s), i ∈ I }.
Every c ∈ F is upper semicontinuous and continuous from the left.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.1 If (A1)–(A2) hold, then there exists a SM P E c∗ ∈ F.
Remark 3.3 The existence of a SMPE in deterministic bequest games [with util-
ity function given in (5)] was proved by Bernheim and Ray [8] and Leininger [9].
The extensions to stochastic bequest games were examined in [20–23]. For instance,
Amir [20] considered games with some stochastic ‘convex production function’, but
his assumptions on the transition probability are different from the ones discussed in
(C1)–(C4). However, the results reported in [23], and later extended in [21,22], were
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obtained for the transition probabilities as in (C4). Additionally, it was assumed that
functions g j and measures μ j in (C4) meet certain requirements. The results in [22]
are stated for Borel state space games and the proof makes use of the Dvoretzky–Wald–
Wolfowitz purification theorem from the statistical decision theory. Intergenerational
stochastic games, where each generation has countably many descendants and the util-
ity is of the form as in (6), were studied in [24] under condition that the state space is
denumerable and in [6,22,25] within a framework of consumption-savings problems
with an uncountable state space. Underlying assumptions on the transition structure
in [22,25] are similar to the ones described in (C4). The model considered by Harris
and Laibson [6] was based on assumption (C2) with the state space S = [0,∞[ and
the linear function f . Their paper provides the existence theorem for a SMPE but for
a specific model (‘hyperbolic consumers’) and under relatively stronger assumptions.
Therefore, Theorem 3.1 in this paper fills a serious gap in the existence of a SMPE
in the theory of stochastic intergenerational games with general utility functions. The
result reported by Bernheim and Ray on page 199 in [13] is a special case of our result.
As already mentioned, the proof given in [13] is based on incorrect Lemma 6 in [12].
Remark 3.4 The idea of using the class F of strategies for analysing equilibria in
deterministic bequest games comes from Bernheim and Ray [8]. Further, it was suc-
cessfully applied to the study of other classes of dynamic games with simultaneous
moves; see [26,27].
The function w is bounded because S∞ is a compact metric space. Let
a = (a1, a2, . . . ) ∈ S∞. Define a(n) := (a1, a2, . . . , an). Let bn+1 :=
(bn+1, bn+2, . . . ) be an arbitrary element of S∞. Write (a(n), bn+1) for the sequence




Clearly, wn can be recognized as a function on S∞ that depends on the first n coordi-
nates only.
Lemma 3.1 Every wn is continuous on S∞ and
lim
n→∞ supa∈S∞
|wn(a) − w(a)| = 0.
Proof The continuity of every wn is obvious. Let a = (a1, a2, . . . ) ∈ S∞. For any n ∈
N, choose b˜n+1 such that wn(a) = w(a(n), b˜n+1). Observe that kn := (a(n), b˜n+1)
converges in the product topology on S∞ to a. Hence wn(a) = w(kn) → w(a) as
n → ∞. Because wn ≤ wn+1 on the compact space S∞, by Dini’s Theorem, the
convergence is uniform. unionsq
We recall that the function u is strictly concave and continuous on S. Let v : S → R
be continuous. Put
V (s, y) := u(s − y) + v(y), y ∈ A(s).
123
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Define
A0(s) := arg max
y∈A(s) V (s, y) and i0(s) := min A0(s), s ∈ S.
Obviously, A0(0) = {0} and A0(s) is non-empty and compact for each s ∈ S. Thus,
the function i0 is well defined.
The following result is a simple modification of Theorem 6.3 in [28].
Lemma 3.2 Let the above assumptions on u and v hold. Then the correspondence
s → A0(s) has a closed graph and is strongly ascending, i.e. if s1 < s2 and y1 ∈
A0(s1), y2 ∈ A0(s2), then y1 ≤ y2. Moreover, the function i0 is lower semicontinuous
and non-decreasing.
Proof Suppose that s → A0(s) is not strongly ascending. Then there exist s1 < s2
and y1 ∈ A0(s1), y2 ∈ A0(s2) such that y1 > y2. Clearly, D is a lattice with the usual
component-wise order on the plane R2. Thus, (s2, y1) and (s1, y2) belong to D. Since
u is strictly concave, from the proof of Lemma 2 in [23], we conclude that
u(s2 − y1) − u(s2 − y2) > u(s1 − y1) − u(s1 − y2). (7)
Adding v(y1) − v(y2) to both sides of (7) and remembering that y1 ∈ A0(s1) and
y2 ∈ A0(s2), we obtain
0 ≥ V (s2, y1) − V (s2, y2) > V (s1, y1) − V (s1, y2) ≥ 0.
This contradiction implies that the correspondence s → A0(s) is strongly ascending.
Obviously, it has a closed graph. Thus, the function i0 is non-decreasing and continuous
from the left. Consequently, i0 is lower semicontinuous. unionsq
Remark 3.5 Lemma 3.2 does not follow from Theorem 6.3 in [28], because in general,
the function V cannot be extended from its domain D to the product space S×S so that
this extension has increasing differences. For example, consider u(s − y) = √s − y,
(s, y) ∈ D.
Lemma 3.3 Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.2 hold. Let ϕ : S → S be a non-
decreasing function such that ϕ(s) ∈ A0(s) for each s ∈ S. If s0 is a continuity point
of ϕ, then A0(s0) is a singleton.
Proof Suppose that y1 and y2 belong to A0(s0) and y1 < y2. Since s → A0(s) is
strongly ascending, we conclude that lims→s−0 ϕ(s) ≤ y1 < y2 ≤ lims→s+0 ϕ(s). This
contradicts our assumption that ϕ is continuous at s0 ∈ S. unionsq
Example 3.1 Let S = [0, 1], u(s − y) = 2(s − y) − (s − y)2 and v(y) = 3y2 for
y ∈ A(s), s ∈ S. It is easy to check that A0(s) = {0} for s ∈ [0, 1/2[, A0(s) = {s} for
s ∈]1/2, 1] and A0(1/2) = {0, 1/2}. Hence i0(s) = 0 for s ∈ [0, 1/2] and i0(s) = s
for s ∈]1/2, 1]. Note that there is no continuous function ϕ : S → S such that
ϕ(s) ∈ A0(s) for each s ∈ S.
123
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Let X be the vector space of real-valued functions of bounded variation on S which
are continuous from the left. Let (ηm)m∈N be a sequence of functions in X. We say
that (ηm)m∈N converges weakly to some η ∈ X iff limm→∞ ηm(s) = η(s) for every
continuity point of η in ]0, s¯[. The weak convergence of (ηm)m∈N to η is denoted by
ηm
ω→ η.
We endow I ⊂ X with the topology of weak convergence. Let M be the space of
all regular signed measures on S with bounded variation. It is well known that M is
the dual of C(S) (see Theorem 14.14 in [29]). Moreover, M is a linear metrisable
topological space when equipped with the weak-star topology. In addition, there is a
homeomorphism between I and the set MS of non-negative measures μ ∈ M such
that μ(S) ≤ s. By the Banach–Alaoglu Theorem, we infer that MS is compact in
the weak-star topology. Thus, I is also compact. This fact can also be deduced from
Helly’s Theorem; see [30]. It is obvious that F ⊂ X is convex and is obtained by a
continuous transformation of I , namely c(s) = s − i(s), s ∈ S, i ∈ I. Hence, we
arrive at the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 3.4 F is a convex sequentially compact subset of the space X endowed with
the topology of weak convergence.
Let Sc denote the union of the set of continuity points of c ∈ F contained in ]0, s¯[
and {0}.
Lemma 3.5 Let cm ω→ c in F and let im(s) := s − cm(s), i(s) := s − c(s), s ∈ S. If
xm → x ∈ Sc \ {0} and xm ∈ S for every m ∈ N, then limm→∞ cm(xm) = c(x) and
limm→∞ im(xm) = i(x). Moreover, limm→∞ cm(xm) = c(0) and limm→∞ im(xm) =
i(0) for every xm ↘ 0.
Proof It is more convenient to work with the functions im and i, because they are
non-decreasing. Take any sequence xm ↘ 0 as m → ∞. We have 0 ≤ im(xm) ≤ xm
for each m ∈ N. Hence, im(xm) → i(0) = 0 as m → ∞. Next note that the set of
continuity points for the functions c and i coincide. Let x ∈ Sc \ {0}. Assume that
xm → x as m → ∞. Choose x ′, x ′′ ∈ Sc such that x ′ < x < x ′′. Then for sufficiently
large m we have
im(x ′) ≤ im(xm) ≤ im(x ′′).
Hence,
i(x ′) ≤ lim inf
m→∞ i
m(xm) ≤ lim sup
m→∞
im(xm) ≤ i(x ′′).
Since x ′ and x ′′ can be chosen arbitrarily close to x , we infer that i(x) =
limm→∞ im(xm). Now the lemma follows from the fact that cm(xm) = xm − im(xm)
and c(x) = x − i(x). unionsq
Next result is due to Serfozo; see Lemma 3.2 in [14]. Let (φm)m∈N be a bounded
sequence of Borel measurable real-valued functions on S. For each x ∈ S, define
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φ∗(x) := inf{lim inf
m→∞ φm(xm) : xm → x} and
φ∗(x) := sup{lim sup
m→∞
φm(xm) : xm → x}.
Lemma 3.6 Assume that μm ⇒ μ as m → ∞. Then
∫
S












Lemma 3.7 Fix any c ∈ F. Assume that μm ⇒ μ as m → ∞ and μ has no atoms in
]0, s]. Let φ and φm (m ∈ N) be bounded Borel measurable functions on S. Assume







Proof Clearly, φ(x) = φ∗(x) = φ∗(x) for each x ∈ Sc. (Recall that 0 ∈ Sc). Since μ























Hence (8) follows. unionsq
Lemma 3.8 Assume that (A1)–(A2) hold. Let cm ω→ c in F, x1 ∈ Sc and x1m → x1
as m → ∞. Then, J (cm)(x1m) → J (c)(x1) as m → ∞.





[g(a1, . . . , an)] → Ecx1 [g(a1, . . . , an)] (9)




[g(a1)] = g(cm(x1m)) → g(c(x1)) = Ecx1 [g(a1)].
123
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m(s2), . . . , cm(sn))q(dsn|im(sn−1)) . . . q(ds2|im(x1m)),
where im(s) := s − cm(s), s ∈ S. Recall that i(s) = s − c(s), x ∈ S. Assume that
x2, . . . , xn are any points from the set Sc. Next take any sequences (xkm)m∈N such that
xkm → xk for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, m → ∞. We have already chosen a sequence (x1m)m∈N
converging to x1 ∈ Sc. By Lemma 3.5 and assumption (A2), we get that
q(·|im(xkm)) ⇒ q(·|i(xk)) as m → ∞ and for 1 ≤ k < n. (10)
Define
φm(·) := g(cm(x1m), . . . , cm(xn−1m ), cm(·)), φ(·) := g(c(x1), . . . , c(xn−1), c(·)).
By Lemma 3.5 and the continuity of g, we conclude that
g(cm(x1m), . . . , c
m(xn−1m ), cm(xnm)) → g(c(x1), . . . , c(xn−1), c(xn)), m → ∞.
Thus, the functions φm and φ satisfy assumptions of Lemma 3.7. Hence, by Lemma 3.7
and (10) for k = n − 1, we deduce that
∫
S
g(cm(x1m), . . . , c
m(xn−2m ), cm(xn−1m ), cm(sn))q(dsn |im(xn−1m )) →
∫
S
g(c(x1), . . . , c(xn−2), c(xn−1), c(sn))q(dsn|i(xn−1)). (11)




g(cm(x1m), . . . , c




g(c(x1), . . . , c(xn−2), c(·), c(sn))q(dsn|i(·))
and using (11), we observe that these functions also satisfy the assumptions of
Lemma 3.7. Therefore, making use of (10) for k = n − 2, Lemma 3.7 we infer
that
123





g(cm(x1m), . . . , c





g(c(x1), . . . , c(xn−2), c(sn−1), c(sn))q(dsn |i(sn−1))q(dsn−1|i(xn−2)).
Continuing the above reasoning we finally arrive at the conclusion that (9) holds.
Step 2. Consider the sequence of functions (wn)n∈N introduced in Lemma 3.1. For





|Jn(c˜)(x) − J (c˜)(x)| = 0. (12)




[wn(a1, . . . , an)] → Jn(c)(x1) = Ecx1 [wn(a1, . . . , an)]
as m → ∞. Making use of this convergence and (12), we can easily show that
lim
m→∞ J (c
m)(x1m) = J (c)(x1),
which completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Let c ∈ F . Put
A0(c)(s) := arg max
y∈A(s) P˜(y, c)(s),
where




and note that A0(c)(s) is non-empty and compact for each s ∈ S and c ∈ F. Indeed, by
Lemma 3.8, we infer that J (c)(x1m) → J (c)(x1) for x1 ∈ Sc and x1m → x1 as m → ∞.
Thus, from Lemma 3.7, we deduce that the function y → ∫S J (c)(s′)q(ds′|y) is
continuous. Define
i0(s) := min A0(c)(s). (13)
By Lemma 3.2, i0 ∈ I. Set c0(s) := s − i0(s). Then, c0 ∈ F. We define the mapping
L : F → F by
Lc(s) := c0(s).
We now show that L is continuous when F is given the topology of weak convergence.
Assume that cm ω→ c in F and consider c0(s) = Lc(s) and cm0 (s) = Lcm(s) for
m ∈ N. By Lemma 3.4, the set {cm0 }m∈N is relatively compact in F. Let c˜0 be any
accumulation point of the sequence (cm0 )m∈N in F. Denote by S0, the set of continuity
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J (cm)(s′)q(ds′|s − cm0 (s)) → u(˜c0(s)) +
∫
S
J (c)(s′)q(ds′|s − c˜0(s))
(14)
as m → ∞. On the other hand, cm0 (s) = Lcm(s), so we have that
P(cm0 (s), c
m)(s) ≥ u(a) +
∫
S
J (cm)(s′)q(ds′|s − a). (15)
for every (s, a) ∈ D and s ∈ S0. Letting m → ∞ in (15) and making use of the




J (c)(s′)q(ds′|s − c˜0(s)) ≥ u(a) +
∫
S
J (c)(s′)q(ds′|s − a)
for every (s, a) ∈ D and s ∈ S0. Therefore,






J (c)(s′)q(ds′|s − a)
⎤
⎦ .
Hence, c˜0(s) ∈ arg maxa∈A(s) P(a, c)(s). Consequently, i˜0(s) := s − c˜0(s) ∈
A0(c)(s). Moreover, s is a continuity point of i˜0. From Lemma 3.3, we infer that
A0(c)(s) is a singleton. Therefore, we have
c˜0(s) = c0(s) = Lc(s).
If, on the other hand, s ∈ S \ (S0 ∪ {0}), then we may take a sequence (xm)m∈N such
that xm < s, xm ∈ S0 \ {0} for each m ∈ N and xm → s as m → ∞. Obviously, we
have c˜0(xm) = c0(xm) for each m ∈ N. Since both c˜0 and c0 are continuous from the
left at s, we get
c˜0(s) = lim
m→∞ c˜0(xm) = limm→∞ c0(xm) = c0(s) = Lc(s).
Observe that c˜0(0) = Lc(0). Thus, we have shown that c˜0 = Lc and therefore L
is a continuous mapping from F into itself. By the Schauder–Tychonoff Fixed Point
Theorem, there exists c∗ ∈ F such that c∗ = Lc∗ and this fact completes the proof.
Remark 3.6 One can prove Theorem 3.1 for concave function u. Then, it is sufficient
to take a sequence (un)n∈N of strictly concave functions converging uniformly on S to
u. For every n ∈ N, there exists a SMPE, say c∗n ∈ F. Without loss of generality, this
sequence has a weak limit, say c∗0 . Using Lemma 3.8 and the fact that c∗0 is continuous
from the left, it is easy to prove that c∗0 is a SMPE in the limiting case.
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4 Invariant Distributions
One of the major interests in economic applications is to examine stability of the
Markov process induced by a SMPE [16]. Therefore, in this section, we provide
conditions that guarantee the existence of an invariant distribution. We start with a
description of essential notions and auxiliary results.
Let (,≤o) be a partially ordered space (poset). An element σ0 ∈  is an upper
bound of 0 ⊂  iff σ ≤o σ0 for every σ ∈ 0. We define supremum (sup 0) as
the least upper bound of 0. A subset 0 of  is a chain iff for each two elements
σ1, σ2 ∈ 0 we have σ1 ≤o σ2 or σ2 ≤o σ1. The set  is said to be chain-complete
poset iff for each chain 0 ⊂  there exists sup 0 in . Theorem 9 in [31] is as
follows.
Lemma 4.1 Let  be a chain-complete poset. If  :  →  is a non-decreasing
mapping, then the set of fixed points of  is a chain-complete poset in the induced
order and has a least element.
Let us set  := P(S) and define ≤o as the stochastic order relation on P(S). Recall
that σ1 ≤o σ2 iff for any non-decreasing Borel measurable function g : S → R,∫
S g(s)σ1(ds) ≤
∫
S g(s)σ2(ds). By Proposition 1 in [15],  = P(S) is a chain-
complete poset.
Let us now turn to the game model studied in the previous sections. We make an
additional assumption:
(A3) If y1 < y2, then q(·|y1) ≤o q(·|y2).
Let (A1)–(A3) be satisfied. By Theorem 3.1, there exists a SMPE c∗ ∈ F. Then
s → i∗(s) = s −c∗(s) is non-decreasing on S. Put q∗(B|s) := q(B|i∗(s)) where B is
a Borel subset of S, s ∈ S. From (A3), it follows that s → q∗(·|s) is non-decreasing.





where B is a Borel subset of S. An invariant distribution for the Markov process
induced by the transition probability q∗ determined by i∗ (and thus by a SMPE c∗) is
any fixed point of . It is easy to see that if σ1 ≤o σ2, then σ1 ≤o σ2. In other
words,  is stochastically non-decreasing. Therefore, by Corollary 4 in [15], the set of
invariant distributions (q∗) for the process induced by q∗ is non-empty. Summing up
the aforementioned discussion and using Lemma 4.1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.1 Assume (A1)–(A3). Let c∗ ∈ F be any SMPE. Then the set of invariant
distributions (q∗) is a chain-complete poset in the induced order and has a least
element.
Our next result is as follows.
Theorem 4.2 Under assumptions of Theorem 4.1, the set of invariant distributions
(q∗) is compact in the weak topology on P(S).
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Proof Note that, if q({0}|0) = 1, then the Dirac measure δ0 ∈ (q∗). Every other
distribution σ ∈ (q∗) is non-atomic. If every q(·|y) is non-atomic (y ∈ S), then
each σ ∈ (q∗) is non-atomic too. In any case, σ ∈ (q∗) has no atoms in ]0, s].
Choose any sequence (σn)n∈N in (q∗). Without loss of generality, we can assume
that this sequence has a limit σ in P(S) endowed with the weak topology. For every









By (A2), the mapping s → ∫S g(s′)q(ds′|s) is continuous. Adapting the arguments









that is, σ ∈ (q∗). unionsq
Remark 4.1 For each σ ∈ (q∗), M(σ ) := ∫S sσ(ds) is the mean of distribution σ .
Theorem 4.1 implies that there exists σ∗ ∈ (q∗) such that M(σ∗) ≤ M(σ ) for every
σ ∈ (q∗). Moreover, for each chain 0 in (q∗) there is a distribution σ ∗ ∈ (q∗)
with highest mean, i.e. M(σ ∗) ≥ M(σ ) for each σ ∈ 0. By Theorem 4.2, there
exists σ ∗∗ with the highest mean over the set (q∗).
Remark 4.2 Theorem 4.1 can be applied to the models with the transition probabilities
described in (C1)–(C3). Note that then assumption (A3) holds automatically. Invariant
distributions under condition (C4) are studied in [22]. However, one may ask whether
the obtained invariant distribution is unique or under which additional requirements
we may expect its uniqueness. Let us mention here few cases. If f (0) = 0 in case (C3)
with the the multiplicative shocks, then the Dirac measure at the point zero is a ‘trivial
invariant distribution’. If we put α = 1 in (6), then the problem reduces to standard
dynamic programming and we know that under certain additional assumptions on f
and u there exists also a non-trivial invariant distribution with support included in
]0, s]; see for example, pp. 1401–1402 in [15]. As pointed out in [32] (see p.1029), in
some circumstances, it is natural to assume that f (0) > 0. Below we shall show that
the model with transition probabilities defined in (C3), with the function f satisfying
the above condition, possesses a unique invariant distribution. For this purpose, we
introduce the ‘monotone mixing condition’ used in [15]; compare also [16].
(M) There exists s∗ ∈]0, s[ such that
q∗([0, s∗]|s¯) > 0 and q∗([s∗, s¯]|0) > 0.
Theorem 4.3 Assume (A1) and (C3). Let z ≥ 0 be such that f (s)z < f (0)z, where
z := s/ f (s). Assume that the whole interval [z, z] is included in the support of the
non-atomic measure π. Then for any SMPE c∗ ∈ F, there exists a unique invariant
distribution σ ∗ for the Markov process induced by q∗.
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Proof Clearly, since f in (C3) is increasing, the mapping s → q∗(·|s) from S into
P(S) is non-decreasing. Moreover, (C3) implies (A2). By Theorem 3.1, there exists
a SMPE c∗ ∈ F. Let us pick any s∗ in the interval ] f (s)z, f (0)z[. Our assumptions
imply that f (0) > 0 and both real numbers s∗/ f (0) and s∗/ f (s) belong to the open
interval ]z, z[. Let Gπ be the distribution function of π. Since π is non-atomic with
support including [z, z], we have that Gπ (s) ∈]0, 1[, whenever s ∈]z, z[. Thus, by
(C3) we infer that
q∗([0, s∗]|s¯) = π ({z : f (i∗(s¯))z ≤ s∗}) = π ({z : z ≤ s∗/ f (i∗(s¯))})
≥ π ({z : z ≤ s∗/ f (s¯)}) = Gπ (s∗/ f (s¯)) > 0.
On the other hand, we obtain that
q∗([s∗, s¯]|0) = π ({z : f (i∗(0))z ≥ s∗}) = π ({z : z ≥ s∗/ f (0)})
= 1 − Gπ (s∗/ f (0)) > 0.
Hence, q∗(·|s) satisfies (M). By Theorem 2 in [15], the Markov process induced by
q∗ has a unique invariant distribution. unionsq
Theorem 4.3 remains also true, if we replace c∗ by any strategy c ∈ F, because
the mapping s → q(·|s − c(s)) is still stochastically non-decreasing. We close this
section with an example illustrating that there is no counterpart of this result in the
model with additive shocks, that is, when the transition probabilities are defined as in
(C2).
Example 4.1 Let S = [0, 2] and f (s) = √s +  for s ∈ S with 0 ≤  < 2 − √2.





0, if s ≤ 0.7,
s, if 0.7 < s ≤ 0.8,
0.8, if 0.8 < s ≤ 2.
(17)
Define q∗ as above. We prove that there are at least two invariant distributions and they
are supported on disjoint sets. First, we claim that q∗([0, 2 − √2]|s) = 1, whenever
s ∈ [0, 2 − √2]. Indeed, we obtain that
q∗([0, 2 − √2]|s) = π
({




z : z ≤ 2 − √2 − 
})
= 1.
Note that the support of q∗(·|s) is [0, 2 −√2], if s ∈ [0, 2 −√2]. Hence, [0, 2 −√2]
is an absorbing set. By Theorem 2 in [15], q∗ restricted to this interval has a unique
invariant distribution, because q∗ satisfies (M) with, for instance, s∗ := (2−√2)/2 and
s := 2−√2. On the other hand, q∗([√0.8+, 2]|s) = 1 whenever s ∈ [√0.8+, 2].
Indeed, for s ∈ [√0.8 + , 2], we get that f (i∗(s)) = √0.8 + . Thus,
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q∗([√0.8 + , 2]|s) = π
({




z : z ≤ 2 − √0.8 − 
})
= 1.
Observe that the support of q∗(·|s) is [√0.8 + , 2] for s ∈ [√0.8 + , 2], and
consequently this set is absorbing. By Theorem 2 in [15], q∗ restricted to this interval
has a unique invariant distribution. Thus, we have obtained two distinct invariant
distributions.
5 Problems in Games With Deterministic Transitions
In this section, we assume that S = [0, 1] and the production function is f (y) = √y.
Below we give an example showing that the approach of the previous sections cannot
be applied to games with deterministic transitions.
Example 5.1 Consider
Ut (ht ) = u(at ) + w˜(at+2).
This is the utility of the form (1) where w = w˜ depends only on at+2. Assume that
u(a) = 4 8√a and w˜(a) = 4√8√a. Consider c(y) = y for y ∈ [0, 0.5] and c(y) = 0.5y
for y ∈]0.5, 1]. Note that i(s) = s − c(s) is a non-decreasing lower semicontinuous
investment function. Observe that
P(s − y, c)(s) := P˜(y, c)(s) = u(s − y) + w˜(c( f ( f (y) − c( f (y)))))
where y = s − a ∈ A(s). Fix any s ∈]0.5, 1]. Put θ(y) := P˜(y, c)(s) with y ∈ A(s).
It is easy to check that
θ(y) = 4 8√s − y, if y ∈ [0, 0.25], θ(y) = 4 8√s − y + 8√y, if y ∈]0.25, s].
Note that the function θ is decreasing on [0, 0.25] and
lim
y→0.25−
θ(y) = θ (0.25) = 4 8√s − 0.25 < lim
y→0.25+
θ(y) = 4 8√s − 0.25 + 8√0.25.
Moreover, we have that
θ(0) = 4 8√s < 4 8√s − 0.25 + 8√0.25 for any s ∈]0.5, 1].
The function θ is also decreasing on ]0.25, s] since
θ ′(y) = −0.5(s − y)− 78 + 0.125y− 78 < 0.
This enables us to conclude that supy∈A(s) θ(y) is not attainable and therefore A0(s) =
∅ for s ∈]0.5, 1].
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Ray [12] and Bernheim and Ray [13] looked for equilibria in the class of upper
semicontinuous non-decreasing investment (savings) functions. Example 5.2 illus-
trates that this set is useless in our approach, since the best response correspondence
may have empty values. In other words, the operator examined in Lemma 6 in [12]
adjusted to utility functions depending on consumptions of following generations is
not well defined. Therefore, a direct application of methods from [12] to a study of the
stochastic model, as it is done on page 201 in [13], is not correct. Here, instead of the
aforementioned class of investment strategies we consider the set of lower semicon-
tinuous non-decreasing saving functions. Such a set was already introduced in [7,8]
for bequest games. However, Example 5.1 shows that this class of functions does not
solve the issue of existence of a SMPE, when the utility of generation t depends on at
and at+2 and the transition probabilities allow for atoms.
Example 5.2 Consider
Ut (ht ) = u(at ) + wˆ(at+1).
This is the utility of the form (1) where w = wˆ depends only on at+1. Let u(a) = 4√a
and wˆ(a) = √a. Consider c(y) = y for y ∈ [0, 0.5[ and c(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0.5, 1].
Observe that the investment function iˆ(s) = s − c(s) is non-decreasing and upper
semicontinuous. We have that
P(s − y, c)(s) = P˜(y, c)(s) = u(s − y) + wˆ(c( f (y)))
where y = s − a ∈ A(s). Fix any s ∈]0.5, 1]. Put ξ(y) := P˜(y, c)(s) with y ∈ A(s).
It is easy to check that
ξ(y) = 4√s − y + 4√y, if y ∈ [0, 0.25[, ξ(y) = 4√s − y, if y ∈ [0.25, s].





s − 0.25 + 4√0.25 > ξ (0.25) = 4√s − 0.25.
Clearly, the function ξ is decreasing on [0.25, s]. From the above discussion, we
conclude that for each s ∈]0.5, 1], B0(s) := arg maxy∈A(s) P(s − y, c)(s) = ∅. Here,
B0(s) is the set of best replies to the upper semicontinuous investment function iˆ given
above.
6 Conclusions
The existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium in an altruistic growth model is a fixed
point problem in an appropriately chosen function space. Bernheim and Ray [7] noted
that the class of consumption strategies, for which corresponding investment policies
are non-decreasing and continuous from the left, is adequate to deal with models with
one descendant. Another family of functions that can be considered as strategies are
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Lipschitz functions. Nonetheless, Example 3.1 shows that the best replies in the set of
Lipschitz functions need not exist.
Example 5.2, on the other hand, illustrates that the replacement of strategies that
are continuous from the left by ones that are continuous from the right results in
non-existence of best reply functions for the current generation even in the model
with one descendant. This problem was not noticed in [12,13], where the games with
countably many successors were considered. Example 5.1 shows that even for the
model with two descendants, we have to deal with compositions of lower and upper
semicontinuous functions. As a result, the current generation may face the problem of
maximising a function that is neither lower nor upper semicontinuous. Therefore, the
best reply of the current generation to strategies of the followers may not exist. Such
situation occurs, when the transition functions allow one to possess atoms, for instance,
when the transition functions are deterministic. Hence, the methods derived from [12]
and then applied to stochastic models by Bernheim and Ray [13] did not solve the
issue of the existence of a SMPE. In this paper, we consider the weak convergence
of non-atomic measures that leads to a generalised Fatou’s Lemma [14]. Since the
strategies used by generations have countably many discontinuity points, we are able
to prove, with the aid of the Serfozo Lemma, a helpful result on iterative integrals,
that allow to compute the expected payoff for each generation (Lemma 3.8). This fact,
in turn, plays an essential role in proving the existence of a SMPE. In this manner,
we conveniently omit technical issues arising in [13], and moreover, we are able to
deal with more general transition probability functions. The transition probabilities,
described by some difference equations and including i.i.d. random variables, are only
special cases in our approach. In particular, our class of transitions embraces also the
transition function of the linear form considered in [6].
Finally, we would like to mention that, except for papers concerning pure equilibria,
there are works on stochastic altruistic growth models, that prove the existence of an
equilibrium in the class of randomised strategies. For example, Alj and Haurie [24]
and Nowak [33] considered such models with a countable state space and a Borel
state space, respectively. However, from the economic applications point of view
randomised equilibria do not enjoy great popularity and are treated as a remedy in the
models, where pure equilibria cannot be obtained.
Other models on stochastic intergenerational games, with one descendant for each
generation and with completely different types of transition probabilities, were studied
in [20] and [23]. As already mentioned in Remark 3.3, they are convex combinations
of finitely many probability measures on the state space and they do not embrace the
transition probabilities described by some difference equation with additive or mul-
tiplicative noise. Particularly, Amir [20] studied transition probabilities with convex
cumulative distributions and had to assume that the set of states is unbounded from
above. However, the class of such transitions is relatively narrow; e.g. in Example 1
in [20], the conditional expectation of capital for every generation given any positive
investment of its predecessor is infinite. Some recent results on equilibria in stochastic
altruistic growth models with many descendants and additive transition probability
functions can be found in [21,22,34].
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